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Abstract
The development of government bond markets and, in  flexible  exchange rate regimes have larger domestic
particular, their currency composition  have recently  currency bond markets, while smaller economies  rely
received much interest, partly because of their relation  more on foreign currency bonds.  Better institutional
with financial  crises. The authors study the determinants  frameworks and macroeconomic  fundamentals enhance
of the size and currency  composition of government  both domestic  currency  bond markets and increase
bond markets for a panel of industrial and developing  countries'  ability to issue foreign currency bonds, while
countries. They find that countries with larger  they raise  the share of foreign exchange bonds.
economies, greater  domestic investor bases,  and more
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During  the  1990s,  capital  markets  around  the  world  have  experienced  rapid
growth and have become increasingly  more integrated.  These trends are reflected  in the
growth of domestic public bond markets  and governments'  participation  in international
capital markets.  At the same time, there have  been many  financial crises,  especially  in
emerging  markets,  a  phenomenon  that  has  been  explained  in  part  by  the  currency
composition of government  debt.  These  factors  have  led  to  a growing  interest on  the
drivers of bond market development and the currency composition of government  debt.
The  literature  that  studies  government  debt  is  vast,  with  particular  attention
shifting  more  recently  to  government  bonds.  There  are  many  studies  on the  general
determinants  of  governments'  desire  and  ability  to  issue  debt.  In  this  literature,
macroeconomic  stability  and  political  economy  factors  are  typically  found  to  be
important  factors. '  The  literature  following  the  debt  crisis  of  the  early- 1980s
concentrated  on analyzing the determinants  of a country's  ability to issue  external debt,
then mostly in the form of loans from commercial banks.2 This literature  focused on the
sovereign  aspect,  i.e.,  the  fact that lenders  cannot  seize  the assets  of sovereign  issuers.
The literature  argues that the amount of debt countries can issue depends on the ability of
lenders to  impose  sanctions  other than the seizure  of assets, as would be the case  in the
domestic  context.  Following  the  debt  crisis,  many countries'  loans  were  restructured,
often into Brady bonds, as  countries regained  access to intemational  markets.  New debt
' See Persson and Tabellini  (1994) for a collection  of political economy papers,  and Persson and Tabellini
(1999) and Walsh (1998)  for reviews.
2 See Eaton  and Femandez  (1995)  for a review  and Eaton  and  Gersovitz  (1981)  and  Bulow  and Rogoff
(1989) for the seminal theoretical  work.took  increasingly  the form  of international  bonds.  The  research focus  evolved into  the
explanation of spreads and pricing of government bonds.3
With  the  rise  in  financial  crises  in  the  1990s,  government  bond  markets  have
gained significant  attention as the structure and composition of government debt can lead
to vulnerabilities  and can trigger a financial crisis.  Two aspects have attracted  particular
interest.  One  is the maturity  structure  of debt.  It  is typically  relatively  inexpensive  to
borrow  short  term,  since  spreads  usually  contain  a  term  risk  premium.  But  a  high
proportion  of short-term  debt tends  to increase the probability of self-fulfilling crises,  as
investors might suddenly decide not to roll over maturing debt or increase required yields
on new debt.  Shallow bond markets  can make this problem worse as they not only limit
the govermnents'  capacity to  lengthen  debt profiles  but  also decrease  the  ability of the
government to roll over outstanding debt and investors'  ability to liquidate positions.  The
literature  that  studies  the  maturity  structure  is  large  and  includes  Calvo  and  Mendoza
(1996),  Sachs,  Tornell,  and  Velasco  (1996),  Rodrik  and  Velasco  (1999),  and  Jeanne
(2000).4
The  second  aspect  that  has  received  widespread  attention  is  the  currency
composition  of government  bonds.  For some  countries,  especially  emerging  markets,
foreign currency debt can be  less  expensive  (or at least appear to be  so) than domestic
currency  debt,  prompting  governments  to  borrow  in  foreign  currency.  But  foreign
currency  debt  exposes  governments  to exchange  rate  risk, as  government  revenues  are
3Perhaps the  first study was  Edwards  (1986),  but has since  evolved  into a large literature mostly  focusing
on secondary market prices, with some studies on primary issues (e.g., Eichengreen  and Mody  1998).
4 The maturity structure choice has led to the various  rules on  what are acceptable  levels of debt payments
falling  due relative  to the level of foreign exchange reserves (named after their principal  or first advocates,
the  Calvo,  Guidotti,  and  Greenspan  rules).  One  rule  of thumb  has  been  that  a  country's  government
extemal debt repayments  falling due in the next  12 months should not exceed  its foreign exchange reserves.
2typically more indexed to local  currency values, and creates the risk of a financial crisis,
as self-fulfilling  runs become  possible.  An important  factor that can impact the currency
denomination  of debt is the choice of exchange rate regime.  Proponents of hard currency
pegs argue that a strong domestic  currency, backed with international  reserves,  can create
credibility  and  lead  to  more  financial  intermediation  in  domestic  currency,  thereby
allowing  countries  to  issue more  debt  in local  currency.  But  others argue  that  a  fixed
exchange  rate leads to greater  incentives for the use of foreign currency  debt by both the
public and private sector, increasing the degree of "liability dollarization."  For example,
fixed  exchange  rate  regimes  might  induce  agents  to underestimate  the possibility  of a
future  currency  change (Eichengreen  1994),  thus leading  to too much  foreign  exchange
borrowing.  Others  claim  that  fixed  exchange  rates  generate  moral  hazard,  given  the
implicit  guarantee  provided  by  international  reserves  or  bailout  guarantees  offered  by
governments  or  international  organizations  (McKinnon  and  Pill  1999,  Dooley  2000,
Schneider  and  Tornell  2000,  and  Burnside,  Eichenbaum  and Rebelo  2001).  A related
literature  (for example, Eichengreen  and Hausmann  1999,  Hausmann, Panizza,  and Stein
2001,  Charnon and Hausmann 2002, and Hausmann and Panizza 2002) has analyzed the
"original  sin,"  which  is typically  defined  as why  emerging  markets  cannot  issue  long-
term debt in domestic currency.
As government  bond markets  have become  a  large  fraction of capital markets  in
many countries,  a literature has emerged analyzing the development of government bonds
markets  in  their  own  right.  This  literature,  separate  from  the  international  finance
literature  described  above,  concentrates  on  the  benefits  of and  the  preconditions  for
3developing  government  bond  markets.5 The  studies  generally highlight  the benefits  of
government bond markets  as bonds can provide an alternative,  non-inflationary  source of
financing  for governments,  foster a healthy capital market,  and  improve the  functioning
of the  financial  system.  Moreover,  active  government bond  markets  can  have  indirect
benefits  through  better  monetary  management,  enhanced  transparency,  a  widening  of
investment  opportunities,  easier  benchmarking  of corporate  sector  claims,  and  a  more
efficient  determination  of the  time  value  of  money.6 A  related  literature  studies  the
institutional  determinants  of government  and corporate bond markets,  using  experiences
based  mostly  on  developed  countries  and  highlighting  the  importance  of proper  debt
management and other institutional  requirements.7
While  the  existing  literature  has  raised  many  important  issues  related  to
government bonds,  few papers have empirically investigated  the issues.  This paper tries
to fill this gap by studying the link between macroeconomic  and institutional  factors and
government  bond  markets.  In  particular,  the  paper  concentrates  on the  following  two
issues.  (i)  What  is the  importance  of the  size of the  domestic  economy  and the  size of
potential  demand for developing  domestic  currency  bond markets?  In other words,  are
there  economies  of scale  in  bond market  development  and how feasible  is it  for small
economies  to  develop  their own  currency  bond markets?  (ii) How  do  macroeconomic
and institutional policies, including the exchange rate regime,  affect the size and currency
5  See  Herring  and  Chatusripitak  (2000)  and  Turner  (2002)  for  an  overview.  Also,  see  Bank  for
International  Settlements  (BIS,  2002),  Asian  Development  Bank  (ADB,  2001),  World  Bank  and
International  Monetary Fund (2001),  and International  Organization  of Securities  Commissions  (IOSCO)
(2002) for institutional  reports.
Besides the case studies  collected  in ADB (2001)  and BIS (2002), there  have been other case studies  on
the development  of government bond  markets  like  Harwood  (2000),  Sharma (2000),  Bose,  Coondoo,  and
Kumar (2001), and Patil (2001).
7 See De Broeck et al. (1998),  McCauley (1999),  Schinasi  and Smith (1998),  Scott (2000),  and  Santos and
Tsatsaronis (2002).
4structure  of  government  bonds?  Although  the  existing  literature  provides  many
analytical  insights to these  questions,  it does not offer many empirical  answers,  at least
not using a broad data set.
In this  paper,  we study  the  determinants  of the  size  and  currency  structure  of
government  bond markets,  analyzing  both domestic  and foreign  currency  denominated
bonds  over a  relatively long time period,  1993-2000,  and  covering  both developed  and
developing  countries.8 The  time span  covers  a period starting  when  many government
bond markets  were  established,  in the early 1990s, to their rapid development thereafter.
We  use  different  explanatory  macroeconomic  and  institutional  factors,  including
variables  related  to the  size  of the  economy,  the  investor  base,  and  the exchange  rate
regime.  The  wide country  coverage  and use of different  variables  allow us to  identify
some of the factors that enable governments  to develop their bond markets.  By studying
specifically  the  currency  denomination  of bonds,  the  paper  provides  evidence  on  the
choice  or  ability  of governments  to  issue  domestic  currency  versus  foreign  currency
denominated  debt.  The  actual  degree  of  foreign  exchange  borrowing,  let  alone  its
determinants,  is not well  known.9 As such, this paper is possibly the  first cross-country
and  time-series  study  that  tries  to  understand  the  development  of  government  bond
markets and its currency structure.' 0
The  rest  of the  paper  is  structured  as  follows.  Section  2  describes  the  data.
Section 3 presents  some  descriptive  statistics  on bond markets.  Section 4 discusses  the
8 Note that some  might call these  sovereign bonds.  We use the term government bonds so that it is clearer
that  we  include  both central-government  as  well  as local-government  bonds,  though  most bonds  in  our
sample are issued by central governments.
9 Perhaps, Hausmann and Panizza (2002),  a contemporaneous  paper to this one, is the only other paper that
that uses this type  of data  to understand  the "original  sin."  But that paper is different  in scope,  obtaining
different results.
5empirical  strategy to study the factors  affecting the size and structure of government bond
markets.  Section 5 shows the estimation results.  Section 6 concludes.
2.  Data on bond markets
We  are  primarily  interested  in  explaining  two  aspects  of  government  bond
markets.  First, we  try  to  understand  the  development  over  time  of the  size  of bond
markets in domestic  and foreign currency across  countries.  Second, we want to study the
share of public debt denominated  in foreign exchange.  We also want to cover the largest
sample of countries  and  the longest  time series available,  comprising both domestic  and
international  issuances, and detailing the currency choices.  Data  sources and availability
differ,  however,  depending  on  the  issuing  country  (particularly,  developed  versus
emerging  economies)  and the  issuing  market  (domestic  versus  international  markets).
While there is a fairly comprehensive  coverage for domestic and international markets  for
many developed  countries  (though even here good coverage  is quite recent),  reliable and
complete data are still scarce for emerging market economies.  Moreover,  in many cases,
a particular source of data covers only one market or one issuer.
Reviewing  the  various  sources  available,  the Bank  for International  Settlements
(BIS) appears to be the most comprehensive  source in terms of countries, years, markets,
and types of securities  covered.  The BIS collects  security-level  data from the  Bank of
England,  Capital  Data,  Euroclear,  International  Securities  Market  Association  (ISMA),
and  various  national  sources.  The  BIS  publishes  these  data  on  an  aggregate  basis,
addressing,  among others, the problem of double counting.  For domestic markets,  that is,
'° It would be also interesting  to study  the maturity structure  of government  bonds, but the data  we were
able to collect are not very rich to analyze that aspect.
6bonds issued  domestically,  the BIS  covers  the public sectors  of some 41  countries  from
1989 to the present on  a quarterly basis, comprising  amounts  outstanding  as well as net,
new issues.  For international  markets,  the BIS provides  quarterly data for 77  countries,
but the coverage starts only in the third quarter of 1993.  All data are measured  in current
U.S. dollars.
We want to understand the size of government bond markets  in both domestic and
foreign  currency.  BIS  data  includes  information  on  the  currency  composition  of the
amount  outstanding  of all  government  bonds.  We  are,  however,  not  interested  in  the
detailed  structure  of bonds across different non-local currencies  and use the information
on  currency  composition  only  to  classify  bonds  into  two  categories:  local  currency
denominated  issues  versus  foreign  currency  denominated  issues,  where  the  latter
aggregates all amounts outstanding in currencies other than the local currency."
Based  on  the  compiled  data,  we  construct  year-end  values  for  the  amounts
outstanding of government bonds  in local and foreign currency and the year-end  foreign
currency  share.  We  use  year-end  data,  as  our  explanatory  variables  are  generally
available  only on  an  annual  basis.  The  final  dataset  of those  countries  and  years  for
which we have the amounts outstanding from both domestic and international  markets, as
1  The  database  also  contains  information  on  "domestic"  and  "international"  bonds,  i.e.,  those  bonds
targeted  to international  and domestic  investors.  This partition  gives  another indication  of the  degree  of
internationalization  of bond  markets.  However,  in a situation with no or very limited  capital controls, the
distinction between domestic and  international bonds becomes difficult,  especially in terms of targeted, let
alone  final, investor bases.  Moreover, the breakdown between  domestic and international  bonds in terms of
investment  base has severe limits,  as foreigners  purchase  many domestic bonds and national residents  hold
foreign  currency  bonds  domestically and  offshore,  particularly  in emerging  markets.  To  a  large  extent,
international  bonds  comprise only  foreign  currency  issues placed under  governing  laws different  from the
ones  that apply  to the issuer.  There are,  however, also  domestic  bonds, which are  issued in or indexed to
foreign  currency and not subject to laws  different from those of the issuer's.  As such, the foreign currency
and market issuance breakdown do not overlap perfectly.
7well  as the currency breakdown,  has a reduced  coverage:  it covers data for  36 countries
between  1993  and 2000.
3  Descriptive statistics
This  section  provides  some  descriptive  statistics  of  the  data  compiled.  The
overall  size of the  global  government  bond market  is  shown  in Figure  1.  In absolute
(nominal)  U.S.  dollars  terms,  government  bond  markets  in  developed  and  emerging
economies  expand  from  some  U.S.  dollars  14  trillion  in  1993  to  some  U.S.  dollars  19
trillion  in  2000.  In  relative  terms,  government  bond markets  of emerging  economies
increased more,  from U.S. dollars  381  billion in 1993  to one trillion U.S.  dollars  in 2000.
Despite the  large percentage  increase, emerging markets  do not represent  more than  five
percent of the world government bond market in the year 2000.
We  next  scale  total  bonds  outstanding  by  gross  domestic  product  to  show  the
relative  debt  stocks  for  each  country,  and  calculate  foreign  currency  shares.  Table  1
shows  summary  statistics  for  these  variables,  grouped  by  developed  and  emerging
economies  and  evaluated  at three  points  in  time,  1993,  1996,  and  2000.  (The  list  of
countries  included in each group  is displayed  in Appendix  Table  1.)  The  first variable,
local  currency  government  bonds  outstanding  over  GDP,  varies  across  groups  of
countries  with  a  low mean  of 19 percent  for emerging  markets  in  the  year  1996  and  a
high of 50 percent  for developed  countries  in  1996.  The relative debt stock variable  for
all countries  has a mean for the whole sample for each of the three periods of 38, 41, and
39 percent respectively,  and is thus fairly constant over the entire period.  For developed
countries,  there  is  actually  a  decline  in  debt  stocks  relative  to  GDP.  This  is  mainly
8because many countries exercised  a greater degree of fiscal restraint over this period than
in earlier decades,  while economic  growth was generally high, contributing to the slow or
no growth in debt stocks relative to output.  For the European  Monetary Union  (EMU)-
members,  an  additional  factor  was  adherence  to the  Maastricht  criteria  that  explicitly
limit the growth  rates of debt  (relative to GDP)  and debt  to GDP ratio.  The one region
for which  the debt burden  is not  stable  is Latin  America,  although  the small  sample  of
countries - Argentina,  Brazil,  and  Mexico - makes  for difficult generalizations  for the
region as a whole.  In this region, the mean debt stock to GDP is only  17 percent  in 1993,
but increases  to 31  percent  in 2000 with the  largest part  of the increase  concentrated  in
the last four years of the decade.
The lower part of Table  I displays the ratio of foreign currency denominated debt
to GDP.  This panel shows that the ratio is lower than that of local currency  denominated
debt  for  both  developing  and  developed  countries  and  all  years.  While  the  ratio  of
foreign  currency  denominated  debt  to GDP  declines  for  developed  markets,  from  10
percent in  1993 to 6 percent in 2000, it increases  for emerging markets,  from 2 percent to
5 percent over the same period.  Foreign currency shares are fairly constant at the global
aggregate level, as trends in developed countries offset those in emerging markets.
The share of foreign currency denominated bonds over total bonds is displayed in
Figure  2.  The  chart  shows  that  emerging  market  economies  are  increasingly  issuing
govermment bonds  in currencies  other than their own, from a mean share of 10 percent in
1993 to some 20 percent in 2000.  On the contrary, developed countries show a declining
trend in the share of foreign currency bonds, from 22 percent to 15 over the same period.
Though not reported,  there are differences  across countries.  A significant  increase takes
9place for Latin American  countries,  from a  mean of seven percent  in 1993  to 33 percent
in 1996,  declining somewhat to 27 percent in 2000, with a high in 2000 of 60 percent for
Argentina.  In  Europe,  transition  economies  also  start  to  issue  relatively  more  debt  in
foreign currency towards the end of the decade.  The  share of foreign currency bonds is
the lowest for Germany and the U.S.12
The differences  between  developed  countries and  emerging  markets  in  terms of
absolute  amounts  and  debt  composition  (that  is,  the  share  of foreign  currency  issues),
become  even  clearer  when  analyzing  in  more  detail  the  structure  of  the  global
government bond market  in 2000.  Figure 3 shows that of the  19 trillion U.S.  dollars  in
government  debt  outstanding  among  the  36  countries,  95  percent  is  on  account  of
developed countries.  The figure  also shows again that foreign currency issues  are much
more  important  for  emerging  market  governments  than  for  developed  country
governments,  17  percent versus  two  percent in  2000.  Among  developed  countries,  the
U.S.  and Japan  are the two largest borrowers  in their own currencies,  accounting  for  74
percent of domestic  currency  bonds  in all  developed  countries.  Not surprisingly,  both
countries  have  relatively  minimal  foreign  currency  borrowings.  Among  developed
countries,  Canada,  Italy,  and  Sweden  are  the  three  largest  foreign  currency  issuers
accounting for some 49 percent of the whole foreign currency market.  Among  emerging
market  economies,  the  two  largest  domestic  currency  issuers  are  Brazil  and  China,
accounting  for 55  percent of the emerging markets'  total, while Argentina,  Mexico,  and
Brazil are the largest emerging market foreign currency issuers, accounting  for 64 percent
12 The  impact  of the  introduction  of the  Euro  is one  factor reducing  arithmetically  the  share  of foreign
denominated bonds among the EMU-members,  but this fact does not affect the figures significantly.
10of the emerging markets'  foreign currency borrowings.  In other words,  the three largest
foreign currency issuers are all from Latin America.
Figure  4 shows the  currency composition of bonds  in the Eurobond  and foreign
markets as of the end of 2000.  The top charts  show that bonds  outstanding of developed
countries are  either in domestic markets  (95  percent) or in the Eurobond  market.  Of the
outstanding bonds of emerging markets,  83  percent is in domestic  markets,  16 percent in
Eurobonds, and the rest in foreign markets.  In the Eurobond market, developed countries
issue mostly in local currency,  62 percent.  This reflects  participation by the U.S. in U.S.
dollars  and  by  European  countries,  for  which  Euro  issues  are  considered  to  be  local
currency  issues.  Dollar  issues  account  for  15  percent  and  Euro  issues  account  for  2
percent.  The amount  outstanding  for developing  countries is mostly in U.S. dollars (64
percent)  and then in Euros (16 percent).  The U.S. dollar  is the most important currency
in foreign  markets, but  currencies  like  the  yen,  Swiss  franc,  and French  franc  are  also
important.  Still, this market's overall size is relatively small.
Figure  5 shows  the  size of the bond  market  and its  composition  for  individual
countries  (the figure is split into two panels to accommodate  the large differences  among
countries).  It displays  some of the expected results,  that is larger countries -in  terms of
GDP-  have larger  government  bond markets and, in general,  have a smaller amount  of
issues  in foreign currency.  Figure  6 shows  the debt stocks  relative  to countries'  GDP.
Countries  with higher debt ratios  are  mostly developed  countries.  This  may be because
these countries'  better institutional  frameworks  and sounder fiscal policies mean that they
have stronger repayment  capacity and can sustain  higher debt-to-GDP  ratios.  It can also
reflect the larger role of the government  in these economies,  in part arising from a greater
11share of transfers, including social security.  Figure 7  shows the share of foreign currency
claims.  The  figure  shows the  importance  of foreign  exchange  issues  for  countries like
Argentina,  Iceland,  Russia,  and  Sweden,  as  well  as  for  some  special  cases  like
Luxembourg,  which is a major financial center for the issuance and trading of Eurobonds.
The  figure also  confirms that  developed countries  tend  to  issue more  debt in  their own
currency,  although there are exceptions  such as Luxembourg  and Sweden.
4.  Empirical methodology
We now turn to analyze the determinants  of the size and currency composition  of
government  bond markets.  The  size  variables  we  use  are  the  ratio  of local  currency
government  bonds and  that of  foreign  currency  bonds  over  GDP,  while  the  currency
choice  variable is the ratio of foreign currency  government bonds over total government
bonds.  We use logs for the three dependent variables.  We estimate the relations between
these three variables and a set of regressors using panel  feasible generalized  least squared
(FGLS)  estimations,  allowing  for  heteroskedastic  error  structures  and  cross-sectional
correlation within countries.  We next specify the set of explanatory variables we use.
The  several  strands  of  the  literature  reviewed  suggest  a  large  number  of
explanatory  variables  to  be  included  in  our  regressions.  In  our  final  selection  of
explanatory variables,  we are mostly guided by the more recent literature  and the need to
avoid endogeneity potentially affecting our results.  Among the factors identified as being
related to the size and development of bond markets, there are many variables that can be
subject  to  criticism  of being  endogenous.  These  variables  include  the  size  of fiscal
deficits, economic  growth, the level of domestic  (nominal and real) interest  rates, as well
12as other macro  variables.  To partly overcome  this problem,  we use as much as  possible
institutional  variables  and  macroeconomic  indexes,  which  should  be  relatively  less
sensitive to the evolution of bond markets themselves.
The specific  explanatory  factors  we  use  (further  detailed  in Appendix  Table  2)
can be  classified into four different  categories:  size and demand;  macroeconomic policy
stance;  institutional  development;  and  exchange  rate  regime.  Regarding  the  size  and
investor  demand variables,  we use total  GDP in nominal U.S.  dollars as  a proxy for the
size  of the economy and the potential  local liquidity of government  bond markets.  To
proxy for the demand for government bonds, we include the ratio of the total deposit base
in the banking system over nominal GDP.  Since the size of the banking system is highly
correlated  with  the  overall  development  of the  financial  system  (including  a country's
institutional  investors  base,  as shown  in  Beck,  Demirguc-Kunt,  and  Levine 2001),  this
measure proxies for the overall potential domestic demand for government  securities. 1
3
For the country's  macroeconomic policy stance, two variables are used.  One is an
"inflation  policy"  index,  a  subcomponent  of the  index  of economic  freedom  of the
Heritage  Foundation.  The  index represents  the absence of strict monetary policy and is
based  on  the  average  inflation  rate,  with  higher  values  representing  worse  monetary
policy.  The  second  variable  is  the  index  "fiscal  burden  of  government,"  also  a
subcomponent  of the  index  of economic  freedom.  This  variable  measures  the  fiscal
pressure  imposed by the government  according to the level of the country's corporate tax
rates and the overall size of government  expenditure.  Contemporaneous  values of these
two variables  are to some extent endogenous,  in the sense that countries  with larger debt
13  The  data  coverage  on  the  size  of institutional  investors  would  have  reduced  the  sample  size  too
substantially.
13may be  able  to  avoid  using inflation  as  a  means  to  raise  revenues  and  finance  higher
expenditure  levels, leading to lower scores  on the two indexes.  We therefore  control for
the  potential  endogeneity  of these  variables  by using  lagged  values  and,  alternatively,
initial values of the regressors,  since  it is difficult to find good instruments.
For the overall institutional framework,  we use a measure called "institutionalized
democracy,"  which is part of the Polity IV political economy database  maintained at the
University of Maryland.  This variable measures the quality of the democratic  institutions
imposing constraints  on the  executive (as  well  as the  degree to  which  civil liberties  are
being  guaranteed).  This  proxy  for the  political  environment  addresses  the  argument  in
the public finance literature that the nature of the political regime  and political instability
may have  an important effect on the  size and  scope  of government  activities,  including
government  debt.
The last set of variables relates to the exchange  rate regime and analyzes the  link
between the  flexibility  of the exchange regime  and the size of the domestic  and foreign
currency  debt markets.  We  use,  alternatively,  one  of three  indexes  of exchange  rate
regimes.  One index  reflects the officially announced  or "de jure"  exchange  rate regime.
But,  since countries do not follow the regime  they publicly announce,  we  use two other
indexes that reflect the actual  or "de facto" exchange  rate regime,  one developed by Levy
Yeyati and Sturzenegger (LYS)  (2002)  and another by Reinhart  and Rogoff (RR) (2002).
Since  the  share  of foreign  currency  liability  can  affect  the  degree  to which  countries
allow their currencies  to  float  (i.e.,  the  exchange  rate regime  can be endogenous  to the
14share)  and  as good instruments  are not available,  we only use lagged or initial values of
the currency regime variable. 14
5.  Regression  results
The econometric  results  are  presented  in  Tables  2-4,  with  each  table displaying
regression  results  for  one  dependent  variable  at  a  time-the  log  of  local  currency
denominated bonds over GDP,  the log of foreign currency  denominated bonds over GDP,
and  the  log of share  of foreign  currency  bonds-using  in  every  table  the  same  set  of
independent variables.  The different  columns display several specifications,  with the two
independent  variables  with  the widest  coverage  (log  of GDP  and  log  of total  deposits
over GDP) always present.  We then add one additional variable at a time in columns 2-6
to  avoid  having  to  reduce  the  number  of  observations  significantly,  given  that  the
independent  variables  have different  country  and  time  coverage.  Columns  7-8  reports
results  with  all the  regressors,  including  only  the  LYS  variable  for the  exchange  rate
regime.'5 Column  8 shows the result using initial values, instead of lagged values, of the
variables  that  might  still  present  endogeneity  problems;  these  are  the  inflation  index,
fiscal burden,  and the exchange  rate regime.  The Wald  tests in all  tables show that the
explanatory variables are  always jointly significant.
Table 2  shows  the results  for the  log of local  currency  bonds over  GDP  as  the
dependent  variable.  We  find  that  countries  with  larger  economies  have  a  larger
government bond market.  This result is very robust and holds across specifications.  This
result is interesting because it suggests that  scale effects may exist in the development  of
14 This phenomenon has been dubbed "fear of floating;"  see Calvo and Reinhart (2002).
15local  government  bond markets.  This  could be because there are  economies  of scale in
the development of the infrastructure  of local bond markets, including incurring the fixed
costs of establishing clearing and settlement systems and developing the legal  framework
for issuing  and  trading.  Also,  it is  very  likely  that  scale  effects  increase  liquidity  in
secondary markets for bonds.
Regarding  the  size  of  the  banking  system,  we  find  that  countries  with  larger
banking  systems  issue  more  debt.  This  result  is  also  very  robust  and  holds  across
specifications.  This result may indicate  that countries  with a  larger depositor base have
more  demand  for  their  bonds.  This  might  reflect  the  fact  that  deposit-taking  banks
directly invest in government  paper  as well  as that  a more developed  banking  system  is
associated with larger institutional  investor bases.  Moreover,  a more developed banking
system  may create  demand for government  securities  among the  general public  through
better-developed  distribution  channels,  possibly  including  the  presence  of  a  primary
dealers network.  This may indirectly increase investors'  interest in buying bonds because
of more liquid secondary markets.
We now turn to the macroeconomic  indicators.  In terms of monetary policies, we
find that lower inflation rates are associated with larger local  currency govermment  bond
markets.  This is to be  expected  since lower  inflation rates tend  to be associated  with a
lower  volatility  of inflation  and,  consequently,  a  lower  tendency  for  governments  to
inflate away the outstanding debt, thus making local currency debt less risky.  Regarding
fiscal  policies,  we  find  that  larger  government  expenditure  help  sustain  larger  bond
markets.  A general larger role of the government, including presumably the ability of the
Is  We  also  used the  other two  variables  for exchange  rate regimes,  obtaining  qualitatively  similar  results.
We omit reporting those results to save space.
16government  to tax the economy more (easily) may thus affect the willingness of investors
to  finance  the state  and the need of governments  to  issue debt.  The  significance of the
larger  fiscal  expenditure  could also reflect  an underlying desire  of citizens  for  a  larger
distributive  role  of  the  government,  both  within  a  given  period  through  larger
expenditures,  and between  generations  and over time  through larger deficits  and higher
debt stocks.  Still, this result has to be interpreted with caution since the variable becomes
insignificant when including other regressors.
Another  robust  result  across  specifications  is  the  sign  for  the  institutional
development  variable.  Specifically,  countries  with  good  democratic  institutions  have
larger government  bond markets  relative to their GDP.  This  suggests that democracy  is
very important  in the eyes of investors, maybe as it is associated with a greater credibility
of the  state,  better  quality  of decision  making,  and a wider  public's acceptance  of the
overall  policy  making process,  including  macroeconomic  policy  making.  This  finding
confirms evidence from Isham, Kaufmnann,  and Pritchett (1995), Acemoglu, Johnson, and
Robinson (2000) as well as from the World Development Report  (World Bank 2001)  and
many  others  regarding  the  role  of  institutions  in  determining  the  quality  of  (macro)
economic  management.  In a narrower sense for the development of bond markets,  it may
be that more effective constraints on a country's executive reduce  the (perceived) risks of
default  on  government  debt,  including  forms  of default  through  inflation  spikes.' 6 A
more  demand-related  explanation  can be that  more  democratic  countries  "desire"  (and
can  sustain)  a  greater  role  of the  government  in  their  economies,  through  providing
16 For more  discussion  on  this  topic,  see  the  political  economy  literature  mentioned  above.  Also  see
Roubini  and  Sachs  (1989)  and  Grilli  et  al.  (1991),  who  analyze  the  electoral  system  and  government
structure as determinants  of public debt in OECD countries.
17different forms of insurance,  leading to higher fiscal expenditures  as well as larger debts
(as discussed above).
Finally,  the  different  exchange  rate  regimes  variables  tend  to be significant  and
have a positive sign.  In other words, countries with a more flexible exchange rate regime
(de jure or  de  facto)  appear  to have  larger  local  currency  bond markets.  Investors  in
countries  with  more  flexible  exchange  rate  regimes  might  be  less  fearful  of  sharp
depreciations  of the currency and of large inflation spikes that can decrease the real value
of their  holdings.  Also,  governments  with more  flexible  exchange  rates  might  finance
themselves more through the bond market,  and particularly through local currency bonds,
to avoid increasing the burden of the debt if the currency depreciates.17
Table  3 presents  the  results  for  the  foreign  currency  bonds  over  GDP  variable.
Unlike  in the case  of domestic  currency bonds,  the log of GDP variable  has  a negative
coefficient  in all specifications.  This result is very robust and the variable is statistically
significant in all specifications.  This result reinforces  the scale effect described  above,  in
the  sense  that  having  a  smaller  domestic  economy  and  lower  overall  demand  for
securities may make it more attractive  for smaller countries to issue in foreign currency in
order to meet their financing needs.  This result is in line with the pattern shown in Figure
2, where  smaller  and emerging  economies  tend to  issue more  debt in  foreign  currency.
The coefficient on total deposits  is also different  in this regression from that for the local
currency bond variable  as it has  a negative  sign.  That is, a larger deposit base decreases
17 There  can  be  also be indirect  interactions  between  the  institutional  framework  and the  exchange  rate
arrangements  chosen.  Some observers have pointed  out, for example,  that the choice of appropriate regime
depends on the accompanying  institutional arrangements  (see Goldstein 2002).
18the amount of debt issued in foreign currency.  However,  the variable is only significant
in some specifications.
The macroeconomic  and  institutional  variables  also have  an effect on the  size of
foreign currency bond markets.  However,  in contrast to the size of the economy and the
total  deposit variables,  these  factors  tend  to  affect foreign  currency bonds  in the  same
way  that  they  affect  domestic  currency  bonds.  Higher  inflation  is  associated  with  a
smaller stock of foreign currency bond relative to GDP.  In some  sense,  this result may
surprise because  inflation  should primarily  affect  the  amount  of local  currency  bonds.
But,  high  inflation  is  also  typically  associated  with  macroeconomic  instability,  what
might explain the lower demand among investors for both domestic currency  and foreign
currency bonds.  Also,  as before,  the fiscal burden variable  is positively correlated  with
foreign currency bonds.  Countries with good democratic  institutions have larger foreign
currency bond markets, suggesting that investors that purchase this type of debt are more
willing to buy bonds when governments  are more legitimate  and policies possibly more
credible.  Nevertheless, the latter result is not robust across specifications.
The variables  that  capture the  actual exchange  rate regime  suggest that countries
with more  flexible  exchange  rate  regimes  have  smaller foreign  currency bond markets
relative  to  GDP.  This  result  is  consistent  with  predictions  of the  literature  discussed
above, in the sense that exchange rate rigidity prompts governments  to issue more debt in
foreign  currency,  possibly  because  it  induces  moral  hazard.  Also,  governments  with
more  fixed  regimes  might  want  to  signal  the  credibility  of their  regime  by  issuing
relatively more  foreign currency  debt.  As foreign currency debt tends to be  cheaper  (at
least  in  nominal  terms),  can  justify  issuing  foreign  currency  debt  instead  of more
19expensive domestic  currency  debt and at the same time claim  that the peg will  persist in
the  future.  This  result  is  also  consistent  with  arguments  according  to  which  foreign
currency  debt  can  act  as  a  disciplining  device  or  commitment  mechanism  (see  Calvo
1996, Jeanne 2002, and De la Torre,  Levy Yeyati, and  Schmukler 2003).  Of course,  the
higher amount of foreign exchange bonds does create some risks.
Table  4  presents  the  results  for  the  variable  foreign  currency  bonds  over  total
bonds.  These  results  can  already  be  to  some  degree  inferred  from the  two  previous
tables,  especially  when the explanatory  variables had different  signs, but this table shows
explicitly how  the different  variables  affect  the  share  of foreign  currency  bonds.  The
table shows  that the  absolute  size  of countries'  GDP  and  the  ratio of deposits  to  GDP
have  a negative effect on the share of foreign currency bonds.  In other words,  countries
with  larger  economies  and  a  larger  depositor  base  have  a  higher  share  of domestic
currency debt.
With respect to the macroeconomic  and institutional  variables,  higher inflation  is
associated with a lower share of foreign currency  debt.  The result suggests  that inflation
has  more  of an  impact  on  foreign  currency  debt,  perhaps  because  holders  of foreign
currency  debt  are  more  sensitive  to  changes  in  macroeconomic  factors  than  domestic
investors  are,  maybe  because  foreign  investors  face  a  larger  set  of  investment
opportunities.  The  coefficient  on the  fiscal  burden  variable  is  positive,  implying  that
countries  with a higher fiscal burden can or want to  issue a higher proportion of foreign
currency  debt, possibly because these economies tend to be more open as well.  Although
the  variable  institutionalized  democracy  is  positive  in  column  3,  it  is  not  statistically
significant  across specifications.
20Though the official exchange  rate regime is positively associated with the share of
foreign  currency  debt,  the  variables  for the  actual  exchange  rate regime  are negatively
associated  with  the  share.  In  other  words,  governments  from  countries  that de  facto
follow  a more  fixed exchange  rate  regime tend to have  a higher proportion of foreign
currency  debt,  as various  papers  predict.  The  differences  in  Tables  3-4 between  the
results using  de jure  and de facto classifications  of exchange  rate  regimes highlight the
disparity  between  these  classifications  and  suggest  that  it  is  important  to  analyze  the
effects of both the de jure and de facto measures.
6.  Conclusions
The  findings  in  the  paper  confirm  much of the  current  thinking  regarding  the
factors  that  facilitate  governments  to  issue  debt.  In  particular,  we  found  that
macroeconomic  and  institutional factors  affect local currency  and foreign currency bond
markets  in similar ways.  The  results  indicate  that better  fimdamnentals  have a positive
effect  on the size  of government  bond markets.  We also found that the stock of foreign
currency  debt  is  more  sensitive  to  these  fundamental  factors  than  the  stock  of local
currency  debt  is.  Some of these  results  are consistent  with previous  findings  for stock
markets  (Claessens,  Klingebiel,  and  Schmukler  2002).  There  we  found  that  better
fundamentals  allow countries  to develop  their domestic financial  markets, but they help
even more in facilitating access of firms to intemational  financial  markets, especially for
emerging markets.
This paper  also showed that government  bond financing  in domestic currency  is
different  from that in foreign currency.  Larger economies and economies with relatively
21large  domestic  investor bases tend to have larger amounts of bond financing in domestic
currency.  Furthermore,  countries  with  more  flexible  exchange  rate  regimes  raise
relatively more domestic  currency finance.  This  suggests  that countries  that can obtain
foreign  financing  do  so  to  substitute  for  domestic  financing,  perhaps  because  of an
inability  to  obtain  domestic  financing  at  reasonable  costs  or  because  of incentives  in
place,  such  as moral hazard considerations  arising from  an international  bailout.  It may
also  be  because  governments  issue  in  foreign  currency  (try)  to  bind  themselves  to  a
higher commitment on macroeconomic management.' 8
Our findings have  several  implications  for  the current  discussion on the benefits
of developing domestic  bond markets,  especially in terms of reducing exposure to foreign
exchange risk for emerging markets.  The  fact that smaller economies tend to issue more
foreign currency  denominated claims  suggests some  scale  effects  in the development of
local  bond markets,  perhaps due  to  the  fixed costs  of establishing  the  infrastructure  or
because  of externalities  in  liquidity.  This  suggests  that there  are  some  limits  to  the
development  of local bond markets.  And the fact that more flexible regimes  can support
a greater  share  of domestic currency  claims  suggests more  rigid exchange  rate regimes
generate  incentives, not only for the private sector, but also for the government to borrow
in foreign currency,  exposing it more to foreign exchange  risk.  This  confirms the latest
thinking  that there can be important  interaction effects  between macro policies and debt
management, which affect overall risks.  As such,  focusing on one aspect  alone, like  the
18  There  is a difference  and a parallel  here  to  the  internationalization  of stock  markets.  The  type  of
financing obtained by corporations in domestic markets  and foreign markets is  broadly similar as firms sell
the same  claim (though  international  markets  may  offer a lower  cost,  greater  volume,  or  higher liquidity
there  is no  currency  difference),  which  is not  the  case  for  government  borrowing  in foreign  exchange
compared to in  local currency.  The similarity is  that corporations  that issue in  international  markets may be
binding themselves  to a different, higher level of corporate governance  standards,  whereas governments  try
to bind themselves  to a higher level of currency stability.
22actual  share  of foreign  currency  denominated  debt  at any  point in  time, may not be the
most useful  indicator of, say, the risk of a financial crisis.  The results also suggest some
dynamic effects, where building up credibility may take time and require  a government to
issue domestic  debt for some time, at what appear to be higher cost than foreign currency
denominated  debt,  after  which  financing  costs  may decline.  What  other  requirements
may be necessary to make this is virtuous cycle is unclear.
While  this  paper  has  helped  to  understand  the  structure  of government  bonds,
many issues  remain open for future research.  On the methodology  front, future research
might investigate  whether good instruments  exist to test and control for potential  reverse
causality  problems  and  endogeneity.  We  did  try  to  address  this  issue  by  using
institutional  variables  and  indexes  that tend  to be more  exogenously determined  as well
as by using lags and initial values, but it  is still possible that we have not been successful
in fully avoiding endogeneity problems.  Also, although we have tested the importance of
several  alternative  and  potentially  relevant  variables,  the  correlations  obtained  can  be
spurious if there are significant omitted regressors,  not yet considered.  Further testing in
these directions  would be welcome.
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27Figure 1
Evolution  of Government Bond Markets
This figure shows the evolution over time of the amount outstanding of govemment bonds issued by the public sector  in billions of
U.S.  dollars.  Bonds are issued in  local and foreign  currencies  in domestic,  foreign,  and Eurobond markets.  The source of the data
is the Bank for International  Settlements.
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Figure 2
Share of Foreign Currency Government  Bonds
This  figure  shows the evolution  over  time of the share  of foreign  currency  denominated  bonds  over total amount  outstanding  of
bonds  issued  by  the  public  sector.  The  values  are  constructed  from  country  averages  and  divided  in  developed  countries  and
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Composition and Participants of Government Bond Markets
The  values  shown are  amounts  outstanding of bonds  issued by the public  sector of 36 countries  (24 developed  and  12 emerging)  as of December  31,
2000.  Bonds are issued in domestic,  foreign, and Eurobond markets.  The source of the data is the Bank for International  Settlements.
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Currency Structure of International  Government  Bond Markets
The values shown  are amounts outstanding of bonds issued by the public sector of 36 countres (24 developed and  12 emergmg) as of December 31, 2000  In the cases of the United States and for  11  European
Umon members,  the U.S.  dollar and the euro  are considered local currencies,  respectively.  The source of the data is the Bank for International  Settlements.
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Country REanking  Based on Government Bonds
This  figure  shows  the  size  of government  bond  markets  of 36  countries  as  of December  31,  2000.  Total  govermnent  bonds
outstanding  are divided  into two categories  depending on the currency of issuance.  The first graph shows data for the seven largest
countries  of the sample  while the second  graph shows  data for the remaining countries  with a different scale.  In some cases, and
especially for the developed countries, the amounts outstanding of foreign  currency denominated  bonds are negligible and may not
appear  visible  in  the  figure.  The  values  are  expressed  in  billions  of U.S.  dollars.  The  source  of the  data  is  the  Bank  for
International  Settlements.
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Country Ranking Based on  Government Bonds I GDP
This  figure shows the  shares of total  government  bonds  outstanding  over GDP,  ranked  in  a  descending  order as  of December 3  1,
2000.  Each  share  is  divided  into  two  categories  based  on  the  currency  of issuance.  The  source  of the  data  is  the  Bank  for
International  Settlements.
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Figure 7
Country Ranking Based oa  Share of Foreign Currency Government Bonds
This figure  shows the shares of foreign currency denominated  government  bonds over total government  bonds  outstanding, ranked
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Summary Statistics
This  table  shows summary  statistics  of two  of the dependent variables  used in the regressions:  local  currency denominated  government  bonds  outstanding  over GDP  and foreign
currency  denommnated  government  bonds  outstanding  over  GDP.  The  series  are  divided  in two  groups:  developed  countries  and  emerging  markets  (See  Appendix  Table  1).
Measures  are  shown  for  three points in  time:  1993,  1996,  and  2000.  The  minimum  values that appear  with  a 0.00  are generally  low values but  not absolute  zeros, however,
Germany presents  zeros between 1993  and  1998 in the second variable.
Local Currency Government Bonds / GDP
1993  1996  2000
No. Obs.  Mean  Median  Max  Mm  Std. Dev.  No. Obs.  Mean  Median  Max  Min  Std. Dev.  No. Obs.  Mean  Median  Max  Min  Std. Dev.
Developed Countries  21  0.46  0.37  1.01  0.00  0 26  23  0.50  0.41  1.10  0.00  0.28  24  0.47  0.44  1.02  0.00  0.28
Emerging Markets  10  0.21  0.11  0.66  0.08  0.20  10  0.19  0.15  0.49  0.06  0.13  12  0.24  0.24  0.42  0.03  0.12
Total  31  0.38  0.33  1.01  0.00  0.27  33  0.41  0.36  1.10  0.00  0.28  36  0.39  0.34  1.02  0.00  0.26
Foreign Currency Government Bonds / GDP
1993  1996  2000
No. Obs.  Mean  Median  Max  Mm  Std. Dev.  No. Obs.  Mean  Median  Max  Min  Std. Dev.  No. Obs.  Mean  Median  Max  Min  Std. Dev.
Developed Countries  21  0.10  0.07  0.37  0.00  0.10  23  0.09  0.05  0.34  0.00  0.10  24  0.06  0.04  0.22  0.00  0.07
Emerging Markets  10  0.02  0.01  0.06  0.00  0.02  10  0.03  0.01  0.07  0.00  0.03  12  0.05  0.03  0.20  0.00  0.05
Total  31  0.07  0.03  0.37  0.00  0.09  33  0.07  0.04  0.34  0.00  0.09  36  0.06  0.03  0.22  0.00  0.06Table 2
Determinants of Local Currency Bonds
This table shows regressions estimated through  FGLS with heteroscedastic  error structure and cross-sectional  correlation for 36 countries  between 1993  and 2000.  For columns (1)
(7), inflation  index, fiscal  burden, and the three exchange rate regimes are lagged one period,  for column (8), these variables  are expressed as their initial values of the time series.
A constant  is  estimated  but  is not  reported in the table.  Institutionalized  democracy takes  higher values  when  countries  have  better democratic  mstitutions  Fiscal burden  of
government takes hlgher values when governments  impose more pressure through expenditure  and tax rates.  Higher values of  inflation  tndex are associated  with worse monetary
policy or higher average  inflation rate.  The  official  and actual  exchange  rate  regimes mcrease  with the  degree of flexibility of the exchange  rate.  The sources  are Polity IV for
uistitutionalized  democracy,  The Heritage  Foundation  for mflation index  and fiscal  burden of government,  IMF International  Financial  Statistics  for total  deposits,  IMF Exchange
Arragements  and Exchange  Restrctions for official exchange rate regime,  Reinhart and Rogoff (2002) for actual exchange rate regime (RR),  Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger  (2002)
for  actual  exchange  rate  regime  (LYS),  and World  Development  Indicators  for  GDP.  The  Wald test shown  at the bottom  is  a joint test that all  of the slope parameters  in the
regression  are jomtly equal  to zero.  Absolute values for z-statistics  are in brackets.  *,  *,  and  ***  mean significance  at 10%,  5%, and  1%, respectively.
Dependent varnable:
Log of Local Currency Government Bonds Outstanding / GDP
Lagged variables  Initial values
Independent variables:  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8
Log ofGDP  0.253 **  0.231  **  0.215  ***  0.063  ***  0.214  **  0.215  *  0.288  ***  0.152  *
[12.739]  [9.661]  [11.175]  [3.123]  [11.0301  [9.138]  [17.018]  [7.728]
Log of total deposits/GDP  0.460  ***  0.298  *  0.511  ***  0.797 ***  0.531  *  0.471  **  0.339  **  0.498  *
[10.014]  [5.232]  [10.432]  [20 704]  [10.651]  [8.707]  [5.009]  [8.234]
Inflation mdex  -0.110 *  -0.082  ***  -0.146 ***
[6.951]  [5.472]  [5.555]
Fiscal burden  0.247  *  0.036  -0.033
[9.290]  [1.566]  [0 659]
Institutionalized democracy  0.095  0.116 ***  0.106  *
[4.164]  [8.269]  [4.695]
Official exchange rate regime  0.049  ***
[2 964]
Actual exchange rate regime (RR)  0.013  *
[3.212]
Actual exchange rate regime (LYS)  0.004  0.014  0.145 *
[0.440]  [0.851]  [4.660]
Observations  159  159  234  203  240  194  144  219
Number of Countries  35  35  35  30  36  34  32  33
Waldtest  533.05  *  206.09  **  223.10  *  493 38  ***  180.26  *  161.19  *  572.46  *  389.65  *
Log likelihood  98.86  80.76  181.72  201.31  192.41  142.08  99.74  171.69Table 3
Determinants of Foreign Currency Bonds
Thus table shows regressions estimated through FGLS with heteroscedastic  error structure and cross-sectional correlation  for 36 countries between  1993 and 2000.  For columns (1)
(7), mflation index,  fiscal burden, and the three exchange  rate regimes are lagged one period,  for column  (8), these variables  are expressed as their initial values of the time series.
A constant  is estimated  but  is not reported  in the  table  Institutionalized  democracy  takes higher  values when  countnes  have  better  democratic  mstitutions  Fiscal burden of
govemnment  takes higher values when governments  impose more pressure  through expenditure and tax rates  Higher values of inflation index are associated  with worse monetary
policy or higher  average  inflation  rate.  The  official and  actual  exchange  rate regimes  increase  with the degree  of flexibility  of the exchange  rate.  The sources are Polity IV for
uistitutionalized  democracy, The Heritage  Foundation for inflation index and fiscal burden of government,  lMF Intemational Financial Statistics for total deposits,  IDF Exchange
Arragements and Exchange  Restrictions for official exchange  rate regime, Remhart  and Rogoff (2002)  for actual exchange rate regime (RR),  Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger  (2002)
for  actual  exchange  rate  regime (LYS),  and  World Development  Indicators  for  GDP.  The Wald test  shown at the bottom  is  a joint test that all  of the slope parameters  in  the
regression are jointly equal to zero.  Absolute values for z-statistics are in brackets.  ,  4,  and ***  mean significance  at 10%, 5%, and  1%, respectively
Dependent variable:
Log of Foreign Currency Government Bonds  Outstanding / GDP
Lagged variables  Imtial values
Independent vanables:  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8
Log ofGDP  -0.759  t  -0.645  t  -0.713  'tt  -0.841 t  -0.687  °  -0.652 t  -0678 t**  -0.681  t
[13.615]  [15.453]  [11.5601  [9.3491  [12.4031  [8.343]  [8.8161  [8.0501
Logoftotaldeposits/GDP  -1.036  O*t  -0.815  t  -0.075  0.208  -0.120  -0.447 t  -1.102  t  -0.193
[14 324]  [11.516]  [0.818]  [1.529]  [1.150]  [3.834]  [11.279]  [I 638]
Inflation index  -0.316  4  -0.258  t  -0.392 t
[13.057]  [7 487]  [6.508]
Fiscal burden  0.584  t  0.284  t  0.794 ''
[11.051]  [3.566]  [3.842]
Institutionalized  democracy  0.123  0 123  0.058
[3.409]  [2 736]  [1.342]
Official  exchange rate regime  0.141  t
[2.592]
Actual exchange rate regime (RR)  -0.003
[0.381]
Actual exchange rate regime (LYS)  -0 002  -0.156  - -0.406  4
[0.072]  [2.385]  [3.253]
Observations  159  159  234  203  240  194  144  219
Number of Countries  35  35  35  30  36  34  32  33
Wald test  326.51  *¢  437.37  4  143.95  t  104.39  b  154.10  ¢  7111  t  52878 ¢  329.88  t
Log likelihood  -30.59  -36.97  -24.54  -11.55  43 29  -57.10  -58.09  -25 59Table 4
Determinants  of the Share of Foreign Currency  Bonds
This table shows regressions estimated through FGLS with heteroscedastic  error structure and cross-sectional correlation  for 36 countries between 1993  and 2000  For columns (1)
(7),  mflation mdex, fiscal burden,  and the three exchange  rate regimes  are lagged one period,  for column (8), these variables are expressed  as their untial values of the tume senes.
A constant  is estimated  but is not reported  in the  table  Instituttonalized  democracy  takes  higher values  when  countries  have  better  democratic  mstitutions.  Fiscal burden  of
government  takes higher values  when governments impose more pressure through expenditure  and tax rates.  Higher values of mflation  index are associated with worse monetary
policy or higher  average  inflation rate  The  official and actual exchange  rate regimes  increase  with the  degree of flexibility of the exchange  rate  The sources  are Polity IV  for
institutionalized democracy,  The Heritage  Foundation  for mflation index and fiscal burden of government,  IMF International  Financial Statistics  for total deposits, IMF Exchange
Arragements  and Exchange Restrictions  for official  exchange rate regime,  Reinhart  and Rogoff (2002) for actual exchange  rate regime (RR), Levy-Yeyati  and Sturzenegger (2002)
for actual  exchange  rate regime  (LYS),  and World  Development  Indicators  for  GDP.  The Wald test shown  at the bottom is a joint test that all  of the  slope  parameters  in the
regression  are jomtly equal to zero.  Absolute values for z-statistics are  m brackets  *, **,  and ***  mean significance  at  10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
Dependent vanable:
Log of Foreign Currency Government  Bonds Outstanding / Total Government Bonds Outstanding
Lagged variables  Initial values
Independent vanables.  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8
Log of GDP  -0.884  ***  -0.918  ***  -0.723  ***  -0.927  ***  -0  705 ***  -0.865  ***  -0 903  ***  -0 722  ***
[18.345]  [22.963]  [14.941]  [13.056]  [14 739]  [15  822]  [18.069]  [12 663]
Log of total deposits/ GDP  -0.849  ***  -0.908  ***  -0.536  ***  -0.645  ***  -0 483  ***  -0.718  ***  -0.969  ***  -0 607  *
[10.903]  [11.963]  [7.006]  [6 072]  [5.257]  [7.349]  [13.728]  [6.869]
Inflation index  -0.095  **  -0 065  ***  -0  100  ***
[4.429]  [4.251]  [3  124]
Fiscal burden  0.199  **  0.212  **  0.562  ***
[8.014]  [4.197]  [3 686]
Institutionalized  democracy  0.065  *  -0.025  0 030
[1.673]  [0.960]  [0.705]
Official exchange rate regime  0.096 **
[2.299]
Actual exchange rate regime (RR)  -0.025  **
[3.116]
Actual exchange rate regime (LYS)  -0.067  -0 131  **  -0.565 ***
[1.589]  [2 283]  [6 601]
Observations  159  159  234  203  240  194  144  219
Number of Countries  35  35  35  30  36  34  32  33
Wald test  391.83  ***  970 96  *  290.78  ***  189.13  *  250 30  *  297 98  ***  916 49 *  379.97  *
Log likelihood  22.42  10.21  28.82  22.07  4 21  -15.41  -9.36  33.28Appendix Table I
Country Clnssificntion
This table shows the list of countries used in the tables and figures following the classification used by
the International  Monetary Fund.
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Series Description and Data Sources
Series  Names  Description  Source
Dependent Vadiables
Local  currency denominated  Amounts  outstanding of bonds (including notes  and  rnmey-market  msirumnents)  issued by the public sector denomnuated  in thei  own  local currency  Bank  for International government bonds  at year-end  values.  The public sector mcludes all  government  levels  and state agencies.  This variable  comprtses issues  un all markets (dousestic,  Settlements, International outstanding (in current U S.  foreign,  and Eurobond).  Comprehensive  data are available  for 36 countries  from  1993  to 2000.  The  DIS sources  are- Bank of England,  Capital  Financial  Statisucs dollars)  DATA, Euroclear,  ISMA, Thomson Financial  Securities Data, and national sources.
Foreign currency  Amounts outstanding of bonds (including notes and money-market mstrurnents)  issued by the public  sector denominated  in currencies dffercnt fion  Bank for International denomnated goveanment  their  own  at year-end  values  The public sector  micludes all govarnment levels  and state agencies.  This variable comprises issues in  all  markets  Settlements, International bonds outstandmg (in  curent  (domesic,  foreign, and Eurobond).  Conprehensive  data  are available  for 36  countres from  1993 to 2000  The BIS sources are:  Bank of England,  Fiancial  Statistics U S  dollars)  Capital DATA, Euroclear,  ISMA, Thmrson Finnial Securties Data, and national  sources.
Share of  forcign currency  This ratio is constructed by dividing foreign currency denominated governmcnt bonds by total government bonds outstanding.  Bank for Intermaonal denornuated  govanment  Settlements, International bonds  Fuincial Statistics
Indepsendent  Variables
GDP at market prices (in  Gross domestc product (GDP) at purchascr pnrcs  GDP data is converted  from domestc  currcncies usmg yearly official  exchange  rates  For a few  The World Bank: World current U(S  dollars)  countries,  where  the  official  exchange rate  does not  reflect  the  rate  efectively  applied  to  actual  foreign  exchange  transactions,  an  alternatve  Development Indicators convcrsion factor is used.  The data cover 36 countnes from 1993 to 2000.
Fiscal burden of goverwnient  Fiscal burden of goveniment  is a component of  the index of economnc freedom pubbshed  by Tc Hentage Foundation and encompasses icome tax  The Hentagc  Foundatton
rates, corporate  tax rates, and government expenditures as percent of output  The varable is a five-category  scale in which higher  scores represent
hugher level of govenmntt expenditure asa percent of GDP and and higher corporate tax rates  The data cover 35 countries fiom 1994 to 2001.
Inlation  index  Inflation mdex is a component of  the uidex of ecnomic freedom pubhshed by The Hentage Foundation.  The vanable is calculated usng the average  The Hentage Foundation
mflation rate from  1991  to 2000 and has a  five point scale where higher values represent higher average  inflation rate of worse  monetary policy.  The
orignal name ofthe vanable is monetatypolcy  The data cover  35 countnes from 1994 to 2001.
Institutionahzed democracy  Instttaionalized  democrac  is conceived as threc essential, interdependent elenents. One is the presence of institutions and procedures through which  Polity IV,  INSCR Program,
citizens can express effective preferences  about alteanative policies and leaders  Second is the extstence  of  institutionalized  constramts on the exercise  CIDCM, Umversity  of of power by the executive  Thrd is the guarantee of  civil libertes to all citzens i  their daily lives and mn  acts of political partcipation  Other aspects  Maryland
of plural democracy,  such as the rule of law,  systems of  checks and balances,  freedom  of the press, and so on are mnean5  to, or specific manifestations
of;  these general  pnnciples.  The  institutionalized democracy  indicator  is an  additive eleven-point  scale (0-10)  The data  covef 35 countnes  from
1993  to 2000Series Names  Description 
Source
Total deposits (current U S.  Thts vanable  is composed  by all the deposits  held by  commercial banks and other  financial institutions that accept  transferable  deposits micludmg  IMF Internatonal Fiancial
dollars)  demand, time and savmgs deposits, and deposits from the government  As the onginal  data are available  in domestic  currency, the year-end market  Statistics
exchange rates are used to convert the variable into U S. dollars.  The data cover 36 countnes from 1993 to 2000
Official exchange rate regime  Official  exchange  rate regime  is coded from  I  to 4 as follows:  (1) exchange rate  pegged to  a single  currency,  (2)  lmuted flexibility,  (3)  managed  IMF Exchange
floatng, and (4) independently  floatmg.  The vanable covers 30 countries from 1993 to  1999.  Arrangements and
Exchange Rsntctions
Actual exchange rate regLme  Actual exchange  rate regime (RR) is coded from I to  15 where higher values represent  more flexible  exchange arrangements and lower values more  Reinhart  and Rogoff(2002)
(RR)  fixed arrangements.  The variable covers 36 countnes from 1993 to 2000.
Actual exchange rate regime  Actual exchange rate regime (LYS) is a three-way classificatLon of  exchange  rate regimes.  The vanable has been transformed in order to have higher  Levy-Yeyab and
(LYS)  values for more flexible exchange arrangements and lower values more fixed  arrangements.  The variable covers 34 countnes from 1993 to 2000  Sturzaiegger (2002)Policy Research  Working Paper Series
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